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Abstract
Why has fact-checking spread so quickly within U.S. political journal-
ism? In the first field experiment conducted among reporters, we varied
journalist exposure to messages that highlight either audience demand for
fact-checking or the prestige it enjoys within the profession. Our results
indicate that messages promoting the high status and journalistic val-
ues of fact-checking increased the prevalence of fact-checking coverage,
while messages about audience demand were somewhat less successful.
These findings suggest that political fact-checking is driven primarily by
professional motives within journalism, a finding that helps us under-
stand the process by which the practice spreads within the press as well
as the factors that influence the behavior of journalists.
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The practice of American political journalism is being challenged by the fact-
checking movement (Spivak 2011), a new style of reporting dedicated to as-
sessing the truth of political claims. Under the objectivity norm that dominates
the mainstream press in the United States (e.g., Schudson 2001; Cunningham
2003; Fritz et al. 2004), reporters have typically refrained from taking sides
in factual disputes or contesting public political claims and focused instead on
narrower definitions of accuracy (e.g., ensuring that quotations are correct). By
contrast, fact-checkers directly evaluate the accuracy of the substantive claims
made by politicians. Over the last decade, this approach has become more
common at many news outlets around the country, including the most pop-
ular and prestigious national news sources (e.g., Graves and Glaisyer 2012;
Amazeen 2013). However, though previous studies have examined the effects
of fact-checking on the public (e.g., Jamieson and Cappella 1997; Garrett et al.
2013; Amazeen et al. 2015; Fridkin et al. 2015) and political elites (Nyhan and
Reifler 2014), little is known about why political journalists are beginning to
embrace this approach.
The growing prominence of this style of reporting raises two important sets
of questions. First, how deeply has fact-checking penetrated standard political
reporting? The genre is popular among journalists (Elizabeth et al. 2015) and
has been widely embraced by elite news organizations. Nearly every national
news outlet now offers some form of fact-checking, including print sources
such as the Associated Press, the New York Times, the Washington Post and
USA Today as well as broadcasters like NPR, CNN, ABC, CBS, and NBC.
However, local and regional news outlets still make up the bulk of the U.S.
press corps. How widespread is fact-checking in the political coverage pro-
vided by these outlets?
Second, how and why has fact-checking spread within journalism and what
can this tell us about the diffusion of innovations within professions? One ex-
planation for the growth of fact-checking is that political journalists and the
outlets that employ them emulate high-status practices in their field, copying
innovations that have received professional recognition as upholding the ide-
als of the profession. In this view, the embrace of fact-checking by elite na-
tional news organizations and the professional acclaim received by dedicated
fact-checking outlets are likely to be the most important factors changing pro-
fessional practice. This account is consistent with the way that leading fact-
checkers promote the practice to their peers, though little evidence exists about
1
the effectiveness of these appeals. If this account is correct, then we should
continue to see fact-checking become more common as its norms and practices
spread from leading journalists to the rank-and-file.
However, professional considerations are not necessarily driving the growth
in fact-checking. One obvious alternative explanation would be commercial
motives (e.g., Hamilton 2004; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010). Journalists and
news organizations frequently justify fact-checking as a response to perceived
reader demand that can attract interest and loyalty from consumers — a ra-
tionale that may be especially compelling in a fragmented media landscape in
which many outlets face declining revenues. This account is also consistent
with evidence that commercial and technological pressures have made journal-
ists more sensitive to audience demand (Bennett 2003; Loosen and Schmidt
2012; Lee et al. 2014). If audience demand is driving the expansion in fact-
checking in this way, we should see further growth in usage of the format as
more outlets recognize its commercial appeal.
In this article, we not only measure the prevalence of fact-checking in polit-
ical coverage but evaluate different explanations for its spread within the U.S.
media using a novel methodological approach. Our study examines the relative
influence of demand- or supply-side factors on fact-checking coverage using a
field experiment conducted among journalists. To conduct this experiment,
which took place during the fall 2014 campaign, we randomly assigned 1689
political reporters at 82 U.S. newspapers to receive different messages about
fact-checking or to a control group. If fact-checking is growing in prominence
primarily due to the status of journalists who practice fact-checking and its
consistency with the core values of the profession, then messages emphasizing
those status and values considerations should increase the prominence of fact-
checking in subsequent coverage. However, if fact-checking content is instead
being produced mainly in response to audience demand, then messages alerting
reporters to readers’ interest in the format should cause it to be covered more
frequently. Our study finds that fact-checking remains relatively rare at the
state level, but that messages emphasizing professional considerations signifi-
cantly increased newspapers’ coverage of fact-checking. By contrast, messages
emphasizing reader demand for fact-checking did not have a significant effect.
As the first field experiment conducted among journalists, this study makes
an important methodological contribution to research on media behavior in
politics. The approach we develop here holds promise for understanding the
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emergence of new practices in other fields and for investigating organizational
behavior within political communication more generally. Substantively, we
present the first systematic quantitative evidence about the process by which
fact-checking spreads and the conditions under which journalists are most re-
ceptive to it. Our results suggest that status and values considerations within
journalism appear to be most responsible for the growth of fact-checking — a
finding with important implications for the study of the format as well as po-
litical journalism, the factors that influence media coverage, and the diffusion
of innovation within professions more generally. Despite increasing economic
pressures, professional concerns still appear to play a powerful role in shaping
journalistic practice.
Causes of innovation in journalistic practice
Historical evidence shows that new practices can spread widely across journal-
ism, ultimately transforming the field. For instance, the terse, news-first “in-
verted pyramid” style that has defined newspaper prose for the last century was
an innovation of the late 1800s.1 The news interview, another elemental feature
of modern reporting, emerged during the same period. To question political fig-
ures and quote them in print had been seen as disrespectful and journalistically
unsound, but interviewing “took like wildfire,” as one contemporary account
put it, in American newspapers of the 1870s (Schudson 2001). The practice
migrated to Britain soon after the turn of the century but did not become ac-
cepted across Europe for several more decades (Schudson 2001, 1995; Chalaby
1996; Høyer and Po¨ttker 2005). Practices like these helped to define journal-
ism as a distinct occupation and became basic ingredients of the objective news
paradigm that took hold after World War I.
Broadly speaking, two schools of thought exist on the shift from the party
press model of the nineteenth century to the objective journalism of the twen-
tieth. Some accounts of the professionalization of journalism have focused on
economic incentives — most notably, the desire to pursue the widest possible
audience by abandoning party ties (e.g., Hamilton 2004). These new reporting
practices emerged against the backdrop of rapid industrialization and urban-
1By contrast, an Associated Press report on Lincoln’s assassination didn’t disclose that he
had been shot until the third paragraph or that he was dead until the end of the piece (Izadi
2015).
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ization after the Civil War, an environment in which mass-market urban dailies
increasingly competed for news, audiences, and advertisers. Press conglom-
eration and the increasing commoditization of news promoted an industrial
work model and made press barons less dependent on party or state ties (Elliott
1978). A related factor is technological change, in particular the spread of the
telegraph, which began to nationalize news audiences and may have promoted
the use of a standardized and neutral news language (Carey 1992; Shaw 1967).
However, many scholars point to flaws in these broad political-economic
accounts for the rise of objective reporting (mainly that partisanship overlapped
with both rising commercialization and the spread of the telegraph, while the
objectivity norm was not consolidated until after World War I). Instead they fa-
vor “sociocultural explanations” (Waisbord 2013) that highlight the emergence
of a new professional self-understanding among journalists, who increasingly
saw themselves as separate from the political field. This new journalistic sen-
sibility was rooted in the reformist politics of the Progressive Era and mirrored
the turn toward science and reason across American institutional life (Kaplan
2002, 2006). It reflected a bid for “authority and respectability” based on ac-
centuating journalism’s public-service mission and independence from politics
(Waisbord 2013). In the 1920s, the objectivity norm was formally articulated
in new institutions — journalism schools, professional organizations, and jour-
nalistic codes of ethics — that cemented contemporary notions of the press as
a neutral observer of and watchdog over political actors (Schudson 2001).
Professional journalism has continued to evolve since the embrace of objec-
tivity. Over the last half-century, reporters have claimed ever-greater authority
to make sense of the political world for their audiences in what has been called
the “interpretive turn” in U.S. news (Barnhurst 2014). As political elites have
become more polarized, print and broadcast journalism has grown increasingly
analytical, assertive, and critical of political actors (Barnhurst and Mutz 1997;
Barnhurst 2003; Hallin 1992; Patterson 1993). One recent content analysis of
the New York Times, Washington Post, and Milwaukee Journal Sentinel cap-
tured this shift starkly: Traditional “just the facts” news reports made up 85
percent of those newspapers’ front-page stories in 1955 but had fallen to less
than half by 2003, having been displaced by “contextual” reports which “focus
on the big picture, providing the context for other news” (Fink and Schudson
2014). Like earlier changes in news practice, this interpretive approach appears
to be contagious — a recent study finds that the “U.S.-led trend” toward news-
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paper coverage that mixes information and analysis has also spread in western
Europe (Esser and Umbricht 2014).
As with the objective news paradigm, competing explanations for this shift
toward journalistic interpretation divide between economic factors and jour-
nalistic culture. One economic argument is that newspapers were forced to
embrace analysis and interpretation to compete with the rise of television news
(discussed in Barnhurst and Mutz 1997). American news audiences have also
changed, growing more sophisticated as education levels have risen, and more
suspicious of official claims as trust declined in government and the press (e.g.,
Levi and Stoker 2000; Ladd 2011). News content has changed accordingly. For
instance, one study noted that to read mid-century newspaper reports decades
later is “to roll back a gigantic cultural loss of idealism” (Stepp 1999).
However, these shifts in practice also again reflected journalists’ changing
ideas about their own role as political watchdogs. As Barnhurst (1997) notes,
abandoning stenographic accounts in favor of sophisticated analysis strength-
ened journalists’ claims to professional status, “justifying increased power and
privilege.” The interpretive turn cannot be understood without attention to the
various professional movements such as “interpretative reporting,” “precision
journalism,” and “public journalism” that explicitly promoted contextual ap-
proaches as part of journalism’s public-service mission (Zelizer 1993; Rosen
1999). Similarly, as we note below, the fact-checking movement has evan-
gelized the genre as upholding the “truth-seeking” role of journalism (Dobbs
2012; Graves and Konieczna 2015) — a mission that may seem more important
as political polarization increases and misleading claims proliferate.
Understanding the growth of fact-checking
Fact-checking is one of the most significant innovations in journalistic practice
in recent years. Its most immediate precursor are the “ad watch” reports ana-
lyzing the accuracy of political advertising that gained popularity in the 1990s
(Frantzich 2002; Glowaki et al. 2004). However, fact-checking gained new
prominence during the 2004 U.S. presidential race (Robertson 5 01) and has
since been further popularized by three full-time fact-checking outlets staffed
by professional journalists: FactCheck.org, which launched in 2003, and Politi-
Fact and the Washington Post’s Fact Checker, which debuted in 2007. These or-
ganizations quickly achieved high visibility and acceptance in the media world.
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Their work has won major journalism awards, including a Pulitzer Prize for
PolitiFact; they have established partnerships with well-known outlets such as
NPR, CNN, and USA Today; and they are cited and quoted heavily in print and
broadcast media (Graves 2016).
During this period, fact-checking has gained traction rapidly among jour-
nalists in the U.S. and, increasingly, overseas (Kessler 2014). Precise measures
are difficult to find, but nearly every national news organization in print and
broadcast in the U.S. and dozens more at the state and local level now engage
in some form of fact-checking (Moore 2012; Spivak 2011; Adair and Thakore
2015). Despite its high visibility, though, a minority of newsrooms currently
offer political fact-checking on a regular basis. A 2015 survey of more than
10,000 graduates of U.S. journalism and communication programs found that,
among those working in journalism, 11% said their news organizations had a
permanent fact-checking feature and another 6% reported fact-checking during
elections (Elizabeth et al. 2015).
The growth in fact-checking over the last decade thus raises an important
question: Should we understand the increasing adoption of this innovation in
political journalism mainly as a response to external factors — for instance, as
the pursuit of a new commercial opportunity in a competitive and fast-changing
market? Or should we instead attribute the rise of political fact-checking to the
influence of professional values and status considerations among political re-
porters? Below we present the results from a new national field experiment
among journalists that evaluates different possible explanations for this phe-
nomenon.
Specifically, we seek to better understand the growth of fact-checking by
evaluating the predictions of two competing explanations for its growth within
journalism: an account emphasizing the role of professional values and sta-
tus considerations (which we refer to as “supply-side” factors) and an alterna-
tive explanation emphasizing increased demand for fact-checking among news
consumers (“demand-side” factors). In this sense, we contribute to the larger
literature on the relative role of supply and demand factors in influencing me-
dia content, which has often focused on ideological slant and negative coverage
rather than the use of new practices (e.g., Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010; Larci-
nese et al. 2011; Puglisi and Snyder 2011, 2015).
One explanation for the growing adoption of fact-checking is that the prac-
tice has been embraced by leading news organizations, including standard-
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bearers like the New York Times. As noted above, PolitiFact won the Pulitzer
Prize for its coverage of the 2008 election, a clear signal of the new genre’s
embrace by journalistic elites. Despite isolated complaints from some re-
porters as the format became more visible (e.g. Smith 2011; Brisbane 2012),
fact-checking has achieved remarkable professional acceptance in the last five
years. For instance, the new public editor of the New York Times dedicated
one of her first columns to a full-throated defense of fact-checking, rejecting
concerns raised by her predecessor (Sullivan 2012). This embrace has been
enabled by the widespread recognition that fact-checking fulfills the core val-
ues of the profession by providing information to citizens about the accuracy
of claims made by political elites. In this sense, it addresses what Gans (2003)
has called “journalism’s theory of democracy,” the assumption by reporters
that their coverage supplies the information citizens need to participate mean-
ingfully in democratic self-government.
This sort of professional influence has often been cited to explain the be-
havior of journalists and news organizations in other contexts. Many studies
emphasize the extent to which editors and reporters monitor their peers at other
news organizations, especially those at high-status, agenda-setting news outlets
(Boczkowski 2009; Gans 2004; Sigal 1973; for a more general review of re-
search on professional status, see Sauder et al. 2012). Content analysis has
repeatedly confirmed these patterns of “intermedia” cue-taking (Boczkowski
and de Santos 2007; Lowrey and Woo 2010; Reese and Danielian 1989; Shaw
1999). The mechanisms by which journalists influence one another include
face-to-face contact at conferences, in press rooms, and on the beat (Crouse
1973; Darnton 1975; Dunwoody 1980; Velthuis 2006) as well as “routine re-
liance” on one another’s published work for the details, sources, and context
that inform developing stories (Shoemaker and Reese 1996; Reinemann 2004).
This research points consistently to two reasons that editors and reporters mon-
itor and imitate their peers: competition for professional status and recognition,
and the need to make editorial decisions (about newsworthiness, accuracy, etc.)
under conditions of uncertainty. Journalists and the news organizations they
work for define success in relation to their peers and may therefore be influ-
enced by reminders of the prevalence of fact-checking among leading news
outlets and the shared professional values that its practitioners seek to uphold.
For instance, Lowrey contends that mimicry within an emerging institutional
field may take place prior to explicit strategic calculation as organizations seek
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legitimacy and stability — a tendency that may help to explain the convergence
among fact-checking sites (2012; 2015).
However, an alternative account of the rise of fact-checking might em-
phasize the role of perceived demand for the often colorful and lively format
among news audiences. Journalists and news organizations respond to com-
mercial as well as professional imperatives in making editorial decisions. For
instance, many studies suggest that reader demand plays an important (though
not always decisive) role in shaping the content of political coverage (e.g.,
Hamilton 2004; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010; Larcinese et al. 2011; Puglisi
and Snyder 2011, 2015). Similarly, numerous editorial innovations have been
adopted because of the perceived preferences of audiences and advertisers
as much as journalistic concerns. For example, the automobile, real estate,
and lifestyle sections that were introduced to newspapers beginning in the
1980s were designed in part as new advertising platforms and have often been
criticized on journalistic grounds (e.g. Underwood 1995; Klinenberg 2005).
Though many of these innovations have been concentrated among so-called
“soft news” topics, it is possible that reader demand could encourage media
organizations to innovate in how they provide political news as well.
Surveys and traffic statistics suggest that fact-checking is quite popular with
audiences, which is consistent with this account. In one N.P.R. survey, listeners
rated fact-checking the most important style of political coverage; three of four
asked to hear it daily (Schumacher-Matos 2012). Established fact-checkers of-
ten cite such figures to demonstrate growing public interest in the format and
to argue that the genre that can broaden the audience for political news. For
instance, PolitiFact exceeded one million visitors per day during the 2012 pres-
idential race — a landmark within the field and a statistic that the organization
trumpeted to counter criticisms that fact-checking had been ineffective (Adair
2012). The mission statements of leading fact-checking sites all emphasize
service to a public eager to hold politicians accountable. Likewise, these or-
ganizations frequently publish reader letters expressing the value of the genre
and emphasize audience demand in negotiations with traditional media part-
ners who license their work or publicize it to wider audiences (Graves 2016).
Hypotheses
Our experiment tests the following preregistered hypotheses:
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Hypothesis 1a: Journalists and media outlets that are assigned to
receive the supply-side treatment will be more likely to incorporate
fact-checking into their political coverage than those assigned to
the control condition.
Hypothesis 1b: Journalists and media outlets that are assigned to
receive the demand-side treatment will be more likely to incorpo-
rate fact-checking into their political coverage than those assigned
to the control condition.
Hypothesis 2: The supply-side treatment will generate more fact-
checking content than the demand-side treatment.
Before discussing the design of our study, two theoretical clarifications are
necessary. First, supply- and demand-side considerations are not necessarily
mutually exclusive. Newsrooms likely consider both professional and com-
mercial priorities before dedicating significant resources to fact-checking (for
instance, by licensing a PolitiFact affiliate or launching a permanent feature).
Similarly, changes in professional practice may be justified in different terms
depending on the audience and the context — for instance, in a journalistic
awards ceremony versus a board meeting. For precisely this reason, the field
experiment described below isolates and compares two prominent rationales
for the increase in fact-checking of the last several years. Second, neither mo-
tivation is necessarily superior from a normative perspective. We take no po-
sition on the relative importance of professional considerations and audience
demand; both can help inspire good journalism but can also lead to low-quality
work.2
Experimental design
To evaluate these predictions and determine what specific mechanisms most
influence the use of fact-checking, we conducted a field experiment during the
fall 2014 general election campaign in which we randomly assigned political
journalists in the U.S. to be sent correspondence that used either supply-side
2For instance, some journalists might pursue high-status scoops of limited substantive im-
portance such as being the first to identify a vice presidential nominee, while others might
pander to audience demand with tabloid-style stories about crime or celebrities.
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or demand-side messages to promote the use of fact-checking or to a control
condition. The design, hypotheses, and analysis of this study were preregis-
tered before the outcome measures had been collected with Experiments in
Governance and Politics (EGAP). 3
This design represents the first application of the use of randomized field
experiments to the study of media behavior. The use of randomized correspon-
dence has been used successfully in other studies of elite behavior (Bergan
2009; Broockman 2013; Butler and Broockman 2011; Butler and Nickerson
2011; Butler et al. 2012; Loewen and MacKenzie 2015; Loewen and Ruben-
son 2011; McClendon 2014; Nyhan and Reifler 2014), but to our knowledge
has not previously been applied to journalists. Previous field experiments have
randomized public exposure to media content (e.g., Gerber et al. 2009; Paluck
2009; Gerber et al. 2011), but have not randomized the messages sent to jour-
nalists themselves.4
The messages we sent to journalists asked them to participate in a survey
about fact-checking while describing different reasons that reporters should
fact-check. Reporters were randomly assigned to receive one of these messages
or to a control group. Each treatment group was sent multiple letters via email
and the U.S. Postal Service. Emails were sent on September 22, September 30,
and October 17, 2014 and letters were mailed on October 9 and 17, 2014. The
number of newspapers and reporters in each condition is explained below in
the randomization and assignment to treatment section.
The supply-side messages emphasized the professional prestige and recog-
nition given to fact-checkers, while demand-side correspondence instead high-
lighted the demand for fact-checking from the public. To amplify their po-
tential effect, both sets of messages also suggested that reporters’ work would
be monitored in order to find outstanding examples of fact-checking according
to the respective criteria of professional status and reader response. (We pro-
vide further details on the content of these messages below and include sample
treatments in the appendix.)
The goal of this design is to test if these treatments affect journalistic be-
havior on the margin consistent with the theoretical argument provided above.
Our supply-side treatment emphasizes the extent to which journalists should
3The preregistration is available at http://egap.org. We note any deviations from the
analysis plan below.
4We also contribute to the broader literatures on field experiments with firms (see Bandiera
et al. 2011) and political institutions (see Grossman and Paler 2015).
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cover fact-checking to follow evolving professional practices and standards,
especially among high-prestige outlets. By contrast, our demand-side treat-
ment suggests to journalists that there is significant audience demand for more
fact-checking. We believe that both of these treatments accord with the types
of factors that motivate professional behavior across a wide-range of fields —
emulating what high-status peers do (supply-side) and delivering what your
customers want (demand-side). Sending numerous letters and emails could
make these concerns more salient to journalists and, in the process, measur-
ably affect the prevalence of fact-checking coverage across our sample.
Supply-side treatment
The supply-side treatments used in our field experiment emphasize how fact-
checking has been embraced by prestigious journalistic peers for upholding the
ideals of the profession. Figure A1 in the Appendix provides the first message
we sent to this treatment group; the other messages that were sent, which are
nearly identical, are available in the preregistration or upon request. The key
components of the messages are:
1. Demonstrating that high-prestige journalists are doing fact-checking;
2. Presenting fact-checking as consistent with the highest ideals of journal-
ism;
3. Informing reporters that the American Press Institute, a respected orga-
nization within the profession, will be monitoring coverage to “identify
the best examples of media fact-checking within the profession during
the 2014 campaign” and stating that “[w]e hope to be able to recommend
your work to them;”
4. A link to a survey asking questions about fact-checking.5
This treatment is consistent with a vast literature showing that peer effects
(broadly speaking) can help to promote the diffusion of behaviors ranging from
voting to intergroup tolerance (e.g., Gerber et al. 2008; Gerber and Rogers
2009; Paluck 2011; Bond et al. 2012; Meer 2011; Bollinger and Gillingham
5The survey was included so that we had a plausible reason for contacting journalists.
The responses were not a planned outcome of the study — only journalists in the treatment
conditions could take part and non-response was, as expected, very high [more than 95%].)
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2012; Kast et al. 2012; Paluck and Shepherd 2012). In particular, comparisons
to peers or social reference groups have been shown to be a powerful tool for
promoting behavior change (e.g., Cialdini et al. 1990; Cialdini and Goldstein
2004; Goldstein et al. 2008; Cialdini 2008; Ayres et al. 2013).6 In particular,
researchers in health are starting to explore the effects of social or peer compar-
isons in a professional context. Releasing performance data seems to have lim-
ited effects (e.g., Marshall et al. 2000; Robinowitz and Dudley 2006). It seems
more promising to specifically highlight comparisons with top-performing pro-
fessional peers (Kiefe et al. 2001; Kolstad 2013) as we do here.
Demand-side treatment
The demand treatment messages used in our field experiment, by contrast, em-
phasize the extent to which consumers want fact-checking content. The first
email sent to this treatment group is provided in Figure A2 in the Appendix;
the other messages that were sent are again nearly identical and available upon
request or in the preregistration. (Supply- and demand- side mailings occurred
on exactly the same schedule.) The key components of these are:
1. Making the case that readers are hungry for more fact-checking;
2. Presenting evidence that fact-checking is attracting significant audiences;
3. Informing reporters that we will be monitoring coverage (and their re-
sponse to reader demand) by stating that “The American Press Institute
will be tracking reader response to your newspaper to identify the fact-
checking content that readers find most compelling during the 2014 cam-
paign” and that “[w]e hope to be able to recommend your work to them;”
4. A link to a survey asking questions about fact-checking.
Experimental sample
The universe for our experimental sample begins with newspapers with cir-
culations over 100,000 that had articles written by staff members available in
full-text electronic databases for 2014. Our dataset consists of 1689 reporters at
6However, it is important to note that peer comparisons are not always effective and can
backfire (Werch et al. 2000; Wechsler et al. 2003; Schultz et al. 2007; Allcott 2011; Beshears
et al. 2011; Livingstone et al. 2011; Costa and Kahn 2013; Bolsen et al. 2014).
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82 newspapers. More formally, we used the following procedures to generate
these outlets and reporters for inclusion in the study:
1. The newspaper must have had a minimum circulation of 100,000 in
2007,7 still be in operation, and continue to sell a print edition (i.e., free
or online-only newspapers are excluded).8
2. The newspaper must have full-text availability for content published dur-
ing the study period in the LexisNexis Academic, Proquest, or Access
World News databases (the news databases we use for this study, which
cover almost all of the outlets selected using the first criterion).
3. Names and email contact information for political reporting staff must
be available for the outlet (necessary for randomization at the journalist
level) and qualifying articles must be published by newspaper staff.9
4. All outlets that had full-time dedicated fact-checking operations were
excluded (current or past PolitiFact affiliates and the Washington Post).
5. The New York Times was excluded because of a conflict of interest. It
was also necessary to exclude the Wall Street Journal, an outlier in the
number of qualifying reporters which created balance problems for the
multilevel randomization design (which is described below).
To create a list of political reporters for each newspaper in the qualifying
sample, we conducted the following political keywords search in an electronic
database in which the newspaper was archived (either LexisNexis Academic,
Proquest, or Access World News) for the period of June 1–30, 2014:
7We used circulation in 2007 because it is prior to the growth in fact-checking observed
starting with the 2008 election and allows for the lag between changes in newspaper economics
and newsroom staffing. Despite the downturn in newspaper circulation since then, the relative
ordering of newspapers by circulation is highly consistent — for instance, all of the top 50
newspapers by circulation in 2014 are in our sample (excluding those dropped based on the
criteria listed below) and virtually all of the outlets in our sample remain among the top 100
daily or Sunday newspapers by circulation.
8This criterion excludes the Examiner [CA], Washington Examiner, Seattle Post-
Intelligencer, Rocky Mountain News, and am New York; the Honolulu Star-Advertiser is treated
as the sum of the circulations of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin and Honolulu Advertiser and is
therefore included.
9All qualifying articles in the Press Enterprise were written by Orange County Register
staff writers; it was therefore excluded.
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election OR presidential OR Senate OR Senator OR Sen. OR
Congress OR Congressman OR Congresswoman OR Legislature
OR Legislator OR “House of Representatives” OR “State House”
OR Capitol OR “state assembly” OR “general assembly” OR “leg-
islative assembly” OR assemblyman OR assemblywoman OR Demo-
crat OR Republican OR Democratic OR DFL OR GOP OR gov-
ernor OR Gov. OR Mayor OR constitution OR “city council” OR
councilman OR council-woman
We included a journalist in our experimental sample if he or she authored
or co-authored three or more articles that included the search terms during the
period in question (excluding opinion articles). To validate this procedure, we
hand-coded a sample of 100 reporters from 25 randomly selected outlets and
found that 81% were correctly coded as having written three or more political
articles.10
Randomization and assignment to treatment
In this study, we utilize a multilevel randomization strategy that ensures that
we obtain valid estimates of the individual-level effects of our treatments as
well as estimates of any potential intra-organizational spillovers within media
outlets. We first block randomized at the outlet (newspaper) level to one of five
conditions and then randomized journalists within those outlets as described
below:
1. Supply side (high) – All of the eligible journalists in the organization
were sent the supply-side treatment messages. Sixteen newspapers and
335 reporters were assigned to this group. All 353 reporters were sent
treatments.
2. Supply side (low) – One half of the eligible journalists in the organiza-
tion were sent the supply-side treatment messages (reporters in the low
saturation conditions were randomly assigned to receive the messages or
10To the extent that some reporters were mistakenly included in the sample despite not focus-
ing on political coverage, it should reduce any treatment effect we find (non-political reporters
are unlikely to cover fact-checking under most circumstances regardless of what messages they
receive).
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not). Sixteen newspapers and 338 reporters were assigned to this treat-
ment group. Of the 338 reporters in this group, 169 were sent the supply
side treatments.
3. Demand side (high) – All of the eligible journalists in the organization
were sent the demand-side treatment messages. Seventeen newspapers
and 331 reporters were assigned to this condition. All 331 reporters were
sent treatments.
4. Demand side (low) – One half of the eligible journalists in the organiza-
tion were sent the demand-side treatment (reporters in the low saturation
conditions were randomly assigned to receive the messages or not). Sev-
enteen newspapers and 347 reporters were assigned to this condition. Of
the 347 reporters in this condition, 173 were sent demand treatments.
5. Control – No reporters in the organization were sent either the supply-
side or demand-side treatment messages. Sixteen newspapers and 320
reporters were assigned to this condition.
At the newspaper level, 34 newspapers were assigned to the demand con-
ditions, 32 to the supply conditions, and 16 to the control condition. Among
journalists, 504 reporters were assigned to treatment in the demand conditions,
522 in the supply conditions, and 320 to the control condition. (An additional
343 reporters at newspapers in the low-saturation demand or supply conditions
were not assigned to treatment.)
By randomly varying the level of saturation of messages about fact-checking
within a random subset of outlets in our treatment groups, we can directly esti-
mate whether and to what extent the treatments are affecting untreated journal-
ists within the outlet — a possible complication in any experimental design of
this type (Philipson 2000; Nickerson 2008; Babcock and Hartman 2010; Baird
et al. 2014; Sinclair et al. 2012; see also Bowers et al. 2013, Aronow and Samii
2012, and Coppock and Sircar 2013). By comparing members of outlets in the
control group with untreated reporters in treatment outlets with low saturation,
this design allows us to estimate whether the effect of the experiment on treated
reporters in those outlets spilled over to untreated reporters within those out-
lets. While we expect that our treatments are capable of having an immediate
effect on reporters, our expectations about intra-organization spillover are more
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agnostic, especially during the relatively short study period. However, it is nec-
essary to evaluate our results for the possibility of spillovers before deciding
how best to analyze the data. If we find no evidence of spillovers, we can ana-
lyze our results at the individual level, but if messages sent to journalists may
be affecting colleagues who were not assigned to the treatment conditions, then
it is safer to estimate treatment effects at the outlet level using the saturation
design described above, which exogenously varies the proportion of journalists
at a given outlet who are treated.
To avoid random imbalances in key covariates across experimental condi-
tions, we utilize block randomization in a multilevel context (Duflo et al. 2007;
Moore 2012). Specifically, we block randomized at the outlet level within
groups defined by the presence or absence of a competitive campaign for gover-
nor or U.S. Senate (those with at least one “tossup” or “leaning” race as classi-
fied by the Cook Political Report on September 15, 2014), maximizing balance
in the number of qualifying reporters at the outlet. We then block randomized
within each outlet at the reporter level according to the design described above
while maximizing balance in the frequency of political coverage by reporters
during the June 1–30, 2014 period (measured using the article count described
above).11 The use of a multilevel block-randomized design ensured that our
treatment and control groups are almost perfectly balanced on these key co-
variates at both the outlet and journalist level, which we demonstrate using the
balance statistics that are presented in Table A2 in the Appendix.
Outcome measure
Our outcome measure is a keyword-based measure of fact-checking coverage.
After the election, research assistants who were blind to treatment condition
searched media coverage by reporters and outlets in our sample for keywords
related to fact-checking — a well-defined and replicable approach with low
false positive rates — to determine where and how frequently these terms were
used by the authors and outlets using the LexisNexis Academic, Proquest, or
Access World News databases. Specifically, the RAs conducted the following
fact-checking keywords search for the period of September 22–November 4,
2014, which was our prespecified study period:
11All randomizations were performed using the blockTools package for R with the default
optimal greedy algorithm (Moore 2014).
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“factcheck” OR “fact-check” OR “fact check” OR “factchecks”
OR “fact-checks” OR “fact checks” OR “factchecker” OR “fact-
checker” OR “fact checker” OR “factcheckers” OR “fact-checkers”
OR “fact checkers” OR “factchecking” OR “fact-checking” OR
“fact checking” OR “factchecked” OR “fact checked” OR “fact-
checked” OR Politifact OR factcheck.org
The RAs then counted the number of qualifying news articles mentioning
fact-checking or prominent factcheckers that were authored or co-authored by
each reporter in the data during the study period. (We excluded letters to the
editor, opinion articles, and editorials; further details and coding instructions
are available upon request.) These totals were then also summed by newspa-
per.12 By focusing on coverage content as our outcome measure, we rule out
the possibility of cheap talk or social desirability effects that might otherwise
be a concern in survey-based responses.
Analysis approach
We test our hypothesis by analyzing the intent to treat (ITT) effect at both the
individual and outlet level. These models are estimated using weighted least
squares with robust standard errors where the weights are the inverse proba-
bility of treatment within blocks.13 The standard errors of all reporter-level
analyses are clustered on outlet to account for interdependence within newspa-
pers. To improve the precision of our estimates, we include a control measure
for the total output of political articles published in June 2014 by the journalist
or outlet in question14 (as measured by the political keyword search described
12As described in the preregistration, we intended to analyze a human-coded measure of
when journalists evaluated the accuracy of public statements in coverage of campaign events
such as debates. However, despite extensive efforts to create such a measure, we could not
achieve sufficiently high levels of intercoder reliability to be assured of the validity of this
measure and therefore do not consider it here. We discuss the need for new measurement
strategies in the conclusion.
13This approach is necessary to correctly estimate the ITT using a block randomization
design — see Gerber and Green (2012, 117).
14We do not use the proportion of political articles including fact-checking terms as an out-
come measure because fact-checking articles may not always include the political keywords
used in our search. The number of articles published in a prior period that include political key-
words is instead used as a predictor variable to approximate the general frequency of political
coverage in that outlet.
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above).15
Results
We find that fact-checking coverage is still quite rare among the broad sample
of U.S. newspapers whose political coverage we analyze. Despite growth in
coverage of the practice (Graves et al. 2015), our keyword-based measure of
its prevalence during the fall 2014 campaign indicates that newspapers without
dedicated fact-checking operations seldom mention it in their reporting. Just 31
of the 82 newspapers in our sample (38%) had a political reporter in our sample
use one or more of fact-checking keywords in our search during the study pe-
riod (mean articles per newspaper: 0.91, 95% CI: 0.52–1.30). Similarly, only
fifty reporters in our sample (3%) mentioned fact-checking explicitly during
the study period (mean articles per reporter: 0.04, 95% CI: 0.03–0.06).
Before turning to formal tests of our hypotheses, it is first necessary to
consider whether our treatment effects spilled over to untreated reporters at
newspapers in the low saturation demand and supply conditions. When we
compare untreated journalists in treated newspapers with those who work at
newspapers in which no reporters were treated (see Table A3 in the Appendix),
the results are not statistically significant. However, the confidence intervals
for possible spillover effects are quite wide and easily encompass the treatment
effect estimates we report for our treatments at the newspaper level below.16 In
addition, if we conduct a post hoc analysis comparing untreated journalists in
the treated newspapers as a group with journalists at newspapers in the control
group, the result is nearly significant (m = .04 for treated newspapers, m = .01
15Our analysis deviates from the preregistration in two minor respects. In our analysis plan,
we had hoped to use two different approaches to estimate the treatment effect on those who
actually received the treatment. Unfortunately, neither of these were possible. The first mea-
sure of receipt of treatment that we hoped to use was whether or not an a reporter opened an
email that was sent to them. However, the survey software package we used (Qualtrics) does
not provide individual-level data on who opens emails sent by the service. We decided not to
use an alternate provider like MailChimp because sending emails to our sample would have
violated their terms of service. The second measure we considered for receipt of treatment
was whether or not a reporter took the survey linked in our email. But too few reporters in the
treatment conditions took the survey (n = 66) to make it plausible that all of the effects of the
treatment operated through taking the survey, which is a necessary assumption in estimating
treatment effects from a measure of receipt of treatment; see, e.g., Nyhan and Reifler 2014).
As a result, all treatment effect estimates reported below are intent to treat effects.
16The 95% CI for the demand-side treatment is (-0.02, 0.08) and the 95% CI for the supply-
side treatment is (-0.02, 0.09).
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Figure 1: Experimental results
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Means by experimental condition. Outcome variable is the number of articles returned by
a keyword search for articles mentioning fact-checking or dedicated fact-checkers written
by political reporters at a large sample of newspapers excluding current or former PolitiFact
affiliates or newspapers with dedicated fact-checkers (see Table A1 in Appendix for full list).
for control newspapers; t = −1.60, p < .06 one-sided). We therefore report
both journalist- and newspaper-level results below.
We first plot mean fact-checking coverage by condition at the journalist
and newspaper level in Figure 1. The bar graph of fact-checking content at
the reporter level by condition in Figure 1a is broadly consistent with our ex-
pectations. There appears to be more fact-checking in the supply condition
compared to the demand condition and more fact-checking in the demand con-
dition compared to the control, though the differences are small. The pattern in
Figure 1b is more compelling, showing that fact-checking coverage increases
with saturation levels in both treatment groups but the supply treatment seems
to have a greater effect.
In Table 1, we estimate the effects of our treatments more formally at
both the journalist and newspaper levels. The results reported in Table 1a are
treatment-specific estimates corresponding to the full models in Table A4 in the
Appendix; correspondingly, the results in Table 1b are the treatment-specific
estimates from Table A5. Each treatment is estimated in a separate model that
is weighted using inverse probability of treatment weights to account for the
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Table 1: Treatment effect estimates: Hypotheses
(a) Journalists
Coefficient
(SE)
Supply treatment 0.03
(0.02)
Demand treatment 0.02
(0.02)
N 1689
(b) Newspapers
Coefficient
(SE)
Supply (high) 1.17*
(0.68)
Supply (low) 0.76*
(0.44)
Demand (high) 0.79
(0.50)
Demand (low) 0.49
(0.38)
N 82
* p < 0.05 (one-sided); standard errors for journalists are clustered by newspaper. Weighted
least squares estimates of each treatment effect where the weights are the inverse probability
of a given treatment for the block randomization design; all models include a measure of prior
political coverage by the reporter or newspaper and are estimated with robust standard errors
(see Tables A5 and A6 in Appendix). The outcome variable is the number of articles returned
by a keyword search for articles mentioning fact-checking or dedicated fact-checkers written
by political reporters at a large sample of newspapers excluding current or former PolitiFact
affiliates or newspapers with dedicated fact-checkers (see Table A1 in Appendix for full list).
block randomization design (Gerber and Green 2012, 117).17
Looking first at the reporter-level results in Table 1a, we observe that our
treatments fall short of conventional levels of statistical significance. However,
the treatment effects are in the direction we expected under Hypotheses 1a and
1b and the coefficient for the supply treatment is larger than the coefficient for
the demand treatment as expected under Hypothesis 2. When we aggregate
the individual-level results at the newspaper level in Table 1b, the results come
into better focus. Both the high- and low-saturation supply-side treatments
have positive and statistically significant effects (p < 0.05, one-sided). By
contrast, neither the high-saturation nor the low-saturation demand treatments
17These models include an indicator for each treatment as well as our estimate of the volume
of political coverage by the reporter or newspaper as a control variable (rescaled so that the
coefficients are more interpretable). As Tables A5 and A6 make clear, our results do not vary
based on the use of these treatment weights, but we include them to maintain consistency with
our preregistration.
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reach statistical significance.18
H1 is thus supported. However, though the evidence in favor of H1a is
stronger than H1b (the point estimates for the supply treatment effect are larger
than for the corresponding demand treatment effects and we can reject the null
hypothesis with a higher confidence level), we cannot reject the null hypothesis
of no difference between the supply and demand treatments at the journalist or
newspaper level in Table 1 or the pooled analysis in Table A6. H2 is thus not
supported.
Do contextual factors affect fact-checking?
While the main effects presented above yield important information about the
average effect of our treatments, their effects may vary depending on charac-
teristics of the outlet or reporter or the political context in which they report.
In this section, we examine whether three specific contextual factors moderate
the effect of our treatments.19
First, we consider whether newspapers vary in how responsive they are to
messages promoting the use of fact-checking based on their past coverage of
the practice, which we measure using the measure of fact-checking coverage
applied to the year before the 2012 election.20 This question addresses poten-
tially important statistical concerns about heterogeneous treatment effects and
also has substantively important implications for understanding which news-
papers are most responsive to efforts to promote fact-checking.
Contextual effect 1: Are messages promoting greater use of fact-
checking more or less effective among outlets who already feature
18To increase our statistical power, it is possible to combine the supply treatments into a
single group and the demand treatments into a single group. When we pool the supply and
demand treatment groups in this way in Table A6 of the Appendix, we find that coverage
of fact-checking increased significantly for newspapers relative to controls among both those
who received the supply (p < 0.05 two-sided) and demand treatment messages (p < 0.05
one-sided). However, because we did not preregister a pooled analysis of the high- and low-
saturation conditions at the outlet level, this analysis represents a deviation from our analysis
plan and should be considered to be exploratory.
19These three contextual effects were included as research questions in our preregistration.
We did not have clear a priori theoretical expectations so we did not include directional hy-
potheses; all results presented here are consistent with and conform to our preregistration.
20We use a median split in the analyses in the main text for expositional reasons and present
models that include a continuous measure of keywords in Tables A7 and A8 of the Appendix.
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fact-checking relatively frequently and the reporters who work at
them?21
A second moderator that we investigate is whether fact-checking by nearby
outlets changes the effects of messages about fact-checking, which we measure
using an indicator for whether a PolitiFact affiliate or dedicated fact-checking
project such as the Truth in Numbers project at the Cleveland Plain Dealer was
in operation in the state in 2014. It is possible that reporters are more responsive
to messages about fact-checking when it is practiced by their journalistic peers
in a state.22
Contextual effect 2: Are messages promoting greater use of fact-
checking more or less effective among journalists and outlets in
states in which an outlet has a dedicated fact-checking operation?
Finally, we are interested in the effects of competitive political campaigns
on fact-checking, which we measure using an indicator for the presence of a gu-
bernatorial or U.S. Senate race with a Cook Political Report rating of “tossup”
or “leaning” on September 15, 2014. One possibility is that the debate and
reader interest generated by competitive campaigns motivate media outlets to
devote more resources to coverage, including fact-checking. In this sense, fact-
checking might act as a complement to existing political coverage, which often
refrains from adjudicating factual claims by candidates. However, an alternate
possibility is that fact-checking acts as a substitute for traditional forms of cam-
paign coverage. When a campaign is less competitive or an important politician
faces little opposition, fact-checking may help provide an alternate form of ac-
countability for their public statements. Conversely, competitive campaigns
might strain the resources of media outlets, which are forced to devote more
coverage to traditional “horse-race” coverage of campaign events, leaving little
capacity for fact-checking.
Contextual effect 3: Are messages promoting greater use of fact-
checking more or less effective in states with competitive statewide
campaigns?
21As we discuss below, outlets with dedicated fact-checking operations are excluded from
our sample. As such, the research question investigates differences among media organizations
that have not made a formal commitment to the approach.
22However, the retrospective study reported in Graves et al. (2015), which was conducted
after our study design was preregistered, found no evidence that the launch of state affiliates
changed the prevalence of fact-checking coverage in 2012.
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We use the same analysis approach to examine these contextual effects as
we did with the main effects. More specifically, we assess whether these dif-
ferent contexts moderate the effects of our treatment by interacting treatment
assignment indicators with the covariate in question (prior fact-checking cov-
erage, PolitiFact state, competitive race).
Looking first at the journalist-level results in Table 2, we see that there are
no significant interactions across all three models corresponding to our contex-
tual effects of interest. Likewise, the newspaper-level results in Table 3 reveal
only one significant interaction.23 The low-saturation supply treatment had
no significant effect on newspapers that were below the outlet-level median
in fact-checking coverage during the 2012 election, but the marginal effect of
the low-saturation supply treatment was statistically significant for newspapers
that were above the median in fact-checking in the previous electoral cycle
(β = 1.49, p < .05). However, this conclusion should be treated as highly ten-
tative given the potential for multiple comparisons problems in this table, the
lack of a corresponding effect among newspapers in the high-saturation sup-
ply group, and the fact that the interaction with the continuous fact-checking
measure in Table A8 is not statistically significant.
In summary, our treatments appear to operate similarly across the different
journalistic characteristics and contexts we identified in our preregistration. We
find no evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects in these cases.
Discussion
This study offers compelling evidence that appeals to journalistic status and
values can successfully promote fact-checking coverage, which might help ex-
plain the turn toward fact-checking in recent years. An appeal based on audi-
ence demand had more modest effects, though it also increased fact-checking
coverage enough that we could not directly distinguish it from the other treat-
ment message.24 It should also be noted that our design does not allow us
distinguish between the effects of the values and information contained in the
23We deviate slightly from the preregistered analysis plan in Tables 2 and 3 for simplicity.
The preregistration says that we will analyze these models using weighted least squares but
it is tedious to estimate separate models for each treatment in each model and the results are
identical (available upon request). We therefore presented unweighted results in the main text.
24It is also possible that messages focused on demand would be more effective than those
relating to supply issues with particular groups of journalists or in certain internal contexts —
for instance, convincing a publisher or editor to embrace the format.
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Table 2: Treatment effect estimates: Contextual effects (journalists)
CE1 CE2 CE3
Supply treatment 0.05 0.04 0.01
(0.05) (0.03) (0.02)
Demand treatment 0.02 0.01 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Political coverage(/100) -0.04 -0.02 -0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
High fact-checking coverage (2012) 0.02
(0.002)
Supply × high fact-checking -0.03
(0.05)
Demand × high fact-checking 0.00
(0.04)
PolitiFact state -0.03*
(0.01)
Supply × PolitiFact state -0.02
(0.03)
Demand × PolitiFact state 0.06
(0.04)
Competitive race 0.00
(0.02)
Supply × competitive 0.08
(0.06)
Demand × competitive 0.01
(0.04)
Constant 0.03 0.04 0.04
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
N 1689 1689 1689
* p < 0.05 (one-sided). OLS models with robust standard errors (clustered at the newspa-
per level in the journalist results). The outcome variable is the number of articles returned
by a keyword search for articles mentioning fact-checking or dedicated fact-checkers written
by political reporters at a large sample of newspapers excluding current or former PolitiFact
affiliates or newspapers with dedicated fact-checkers (see Table A1 in Appendix for full list).
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Table 3: Treatment effect estimates: Contextual effects (newspapers)
RQ1 RQ2 RQ3
Supply treatment (high) 1.60 1.61* 0.69*
(1.37) (0.94) (0.34)
Supply treatment (low) -0.07 1.11* 0.79
(0.30) (0.58) (0.52)
Demand treatment (high) 0.29 0.70 0.90
(0.39) (0.74) (0.73)
Demand treatment (low) 0.80 0.49 0.88*
(0.74) (0.44) (0.51)
Political coverage (/1000) 0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
High fact-checking coverage (2012) -0.41*
(0.24)
Supply (high) × high fact-checking -0.61
(1.44)
Supply (low) × high fact-checking 1.56*
(0.74)
Demand (high) × high fact-checking 1.94
(1.96)
Demand (low) × high fact-checking -0.22
(0.84)
PolitiFact state -0.28*
(0.17)
Supply (high) × PolitiFact state -1.22
(0.95)
Supply (low) × PolitiFact state -1.10
(0.58)
Demand (high) × PolitiFact state 0.48
(0.94)
Demand (low) × PolitiFact state 0.00
(0.58)
Competitive race 0.39
(0.35)
Supply (high) × competitive 1.30
(1.62)
Supply (low) × competitive 0.02
(1.04)
Demand (high) × competitive -0.24
(1.02)
Demand (low) × competitive -1.06
(0.69)
Constant 0.39 0.26
(0.23) (0.18)
N 82 82 82
* p < 0.05 (one-sided). OLS models with robust standard errors. The outcome variable is the number of articles
returned by a keyword search for articles mentioning fact-checking or dedicated fact-checkers written by political
reporters at a large sample of newspapers excluding current or former PolitiFact affiliates or newspapers with dedicated
fact-checkers (see Table A1 in Appendix for full list).
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messages and the promise of monitoring. However, the possibility of attention
from professional peers (the American Press Institute in this study) is consis-
tent with the real-world mechanism of peer influence that we hoped to test.
While the absolute effect sizes in our experiment are relatively modest —
approximately one additional story mentioning fact-checking per treated news-
paper — the effects are quite large relative to the extremely low baseline. Most
of the newspapers studied did not produce even a single qualifying article ab-
sent our stimulus (81% of newspapers in our control group published 0 articles
[13/16]; m = .25). By contrast, the prevalence of fact-checking coverage in-
creased substantially in our treatment conditions, especially the low- and high-
saturation supply conditions (m=1.06 and m=1.44, respectively) but also the
demand conditions (m=0.76 for low saturation, m=1.06 for high saturation).
These results should also be considered in light of the particular challenge
faced by field experiments such as this one. In contrast to studies which mea-
sure survey-based outcomes under tightly controlled experimental conditions,
we evaluate the effect of our treatments in the real world on the actual outcome
of interest: journalistic behavior during a real U.S. election. This approach
maximizes the external validity of our results and minimizes the extrapola-
tion that is necessary from more artificial study contexts. However, it also
requires testing the effect of a necessarily weak and artificial treatment on the
real-world behavior of professionals facing the demands and pressures of their
actual workplaces, which diluted the effects of our treatment. Unlike subjects
recruited for a controlled experiment, some of the busy journalists we studied
may have given our letters and emails little attention or ignored therm alto-
gether, which likely explains why we can better distinguish the effects of the
experiment at the outlet level due to the power of aggregation.
In particular, these estimates are intent to treat effects; the effect sizes we
estimate would likely be substantially greater if we were able to estimate treat-
ment effects on those reporters who actually received the treatments. Similarly,
providing information about the fact-checking trend may have a more limited
effect than actually observing audience demand for fact-checking or the profes-
sional accolades it can bring. Reporters are more likely to be moved to action
by direct firsthand experience than messages from scholars, which makes it all
the more remarkable that we observe measurable effects in our sample.
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Conclusion
Why do journalists fact-check? In this article, the first field experiment of
its kind, we find compelling evidence that fact-checking spreads primarily be-
cause it appeals to the values and status concerns of journalists. When political
reporters at U.S. newspapers are reminded that fact-checking is a prestigious
activity that upholds the ideals of their profession, we observe a significant in-
crease in subsequent fact-checking coverage. Reminders of audience interest
in the practice have more modest effects.
These results suggest that professional imperatives continue to exercise
substantial influence on the behavior of political journalists despite the com-
mercial incentives they face to satisfy audience demand. Recent research sug-
gests that online audience data has made news organizations more sensitive to
consumer preferences (Loosen and Schmidt 2012; Lee et al. 2014; Anderson
2011), raising longstanding concerns about the erosion of journalistic values
as outlets prioritize commercially successful content (Thussu 2007; Bennett
2003; Boczkowski and Peer 2011). This study offers suggestive countervailing
evidence that notions of good journalism are still playing an important role in
the spread and adoption of a new genre of political reporting.25
As with all studies, ours has limitations that point the way for future re-
search. First, it is essential to design reliable approaches to more directly
measure the incidence of political fact-checking in news reports using human
coding that can recognize the (unlabeled) occurrence of the practice of fact-
checking. While we are confident in the results generated by our keyword-
based approach, scholars should seek to establish a consensus definition of po-
litical fact-checking (journalists apply the term to a range of techniques and
formats) and develop a coding procedure that can reliably and comprehen-
sively identify instances of the practice. Identifying unlabeled instances of
fact-checking is an extremely difficult task that requires coders to consider nu-
merous subtle factors such as the framing of a story, the choice and deployment
of sources, and the distinction between subjective criticism and direct evalua-
tions of accuracy. Still, we will need to develop such measures to understand
the changes taking place in journalism today.
In addition, more research is needed on dynamics within newsrooms that
25As noted above, however, arguments about audience interest in fact-checking may still
play an important role when organizations decide whether invest in the format.
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can help us understand why fact-checking is embraced by certain outlets and
not others. Though our field experiment found significant results at the news-
paper level, the results do not clearly indicate whether outlet- or reporter-level
factors are more important in the growth of the practice. In addition, our design
does not allow us to consider how the two levels of analysis might interact. For
instance, individual reporters might typically begin fact-checking before their
newsrooms adopt the practice more formally, though in other cases an organi-
zational mandate could help encourage journalists in the newsroom to change
their approach. Further research into these mechanisms is needed.
Nonetheless, this research makes a valuable contribution to the study of
elite behavior and the media by demonstrating that it is possible to use field ex-
periments to understand the factors shaping news coverage and other behaviors
of interest within communication. While field experiments are becoming more
common in studies of elected and administrative officials, we demonstrate that
the approach can also be applied to other elite populations. The application
of randomized treatments to a large sample of reporters allows us to make
more convincing causal inferences about influences on media coverage than
many previous studies, which are often forced to rely on case studies or small
samples of observational data. Likewise, our focus on a publicly observable
outcome (media coverage) minimizes concerns about social desirability bias in
elite interviews or surveys.
This study also demonstrates how experimental research can build upon
and complement historical and sociological studies of professional practice.
Studies like this one can shed light on the contestation over professional values
or practices in any field where these are reliably reflected in public behav-
ior, including various forms of routine public communication such as press re-
leases, newsletters, blog posts, and tweets. The approach we develop here also
holds particular promise in studying political communication today. Against
the backdrop of the so-called “mediatization” of politics (Deacon and Stanyer
2014; Stro¨mba¨ck 2008), it is increasingly important to understand the media
behavior of a wide range of institutional political actors including party orga-
nizations, campaigns, and movement or issue organizations.
Ultimately, however, our most important contribution is to research on
the factors that influence media content and the adoption of new journalistic
practices, which often emphasize either commercial incentives or journalistic
norms and status concerns — a recurring tension in both the history of the
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American political press and previous research on its development. While the
fact-checking movement often cites audience interest in its work, our results in-
dicate that messages emphasizing professional considerations were most effec-
tive in increasing coverage of the practice. Despite the pressures on reporters
to meet audience demand in a difficult business environment for newspapers, it
appears that political journalists still enjoy substantial autonomy to respond to
professional incentives.
29
References
Adair, B. (2012). The value of fact-checking in the 2012 campaign. Poli-
tifact, November 8, 2012. Downloaded July 23, 2014 from http:
//www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2012/nov/
08/value-fact-checking-2012-campaign/.
Adair, B. and Thakore, I. (2015). Fact-checking census finds continued growth around
the world. Downloaded February 25, 2014 from http://reporterslab.
org/fact-checking-census-finds-growth-around-world/.
Allcott, H. (2011). Social norms and energy conservation. Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 95(9):1082–1095.
Amazeen, M. A. (2013). Making a difference? a critical assessment of fact-checking
in 2012. New America Foundation Media Policy Initiative Research Paper.
Amazeen, M. A., Thorson, E., Muddiman, A., and Graves, L. (2015).
A comparison of correction formats: The effectiveness and effects of
rating scale versus contextual corrections on misinformation. Ameri-
can Press Institute. Downloaded April 27, 2015 from http://www.
americanpressinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/
04/The-Effectiveness-of-Rating-Scales.pdf.
Anderson, C. W. (2011). Between creative and quantified audiences: Web metrics and
changing patterns of newswork in local US newsrooms. Journalism, 12(5):550–566.
Aronow, P. M. and Samii, C. (2012). Estimating average causal effects under interfer-
ence between units. Unpublished manuscript.
Ayres, I., Raseman, S., and Shih, A. (2013). Evidence from two large field experiments
that peer comparison feedback can reduce residential energy usage. Journal of Law,
Economics, and Organization, 29(5):992–1022.
Babcock, P. S. and Hartman, J. L. (2010). Networks and workouts: Treatment size
and status specific peer effects in a randomized field experiment. National Bureau
of Economic Research working paper.
Baird, S., Bohren, A., McIntosh, C., and Ozler, B. (2014). Designing experiments
to measure spillover and threshold effects. World Bank Policy Research Working
Paper 6824.
Bandiera, O., Barankay, I., and Rasul, I. (2011). Field experiments with firms. Journal
of Economic Perspectives, 25(3):63–82.
30
Barnhurst, K. G. (2003). The makers of meaning: national public radio and the new
long journalism, 1980-2000. Political Communication, 20(1):1–22.
Barnhurst, K. G. (2014). The Interpretive Turn in News. In Zimmermann, C. and
Schreiber, M., editors, Journalism and Technological Change: Historical Perspec-
tives, Contemporary Trends, pages 111–14. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Barnhurst, K. G. and Mutz, D. (1997). American journalism and the decline in event-
centered reporting. Journal of Communication, 47(4):27–53.
Bennett, L. W. (2003). The burglar alarm that just keeps ringing: A response to zaller.
Political Communication, 20(2):131–138.
Bergan, D. E. (2009). Does grassroots lobbying work? A field experiment measur-
ing the effects of an e-mail lobbying campaign on legislative behavior. American
Politics Research, 37(2):327–352.
Beshears, J., Choi, J. J., Laibson, D., Madrian, B. C., and Milkman, K. L. (2011). The
effect of providing peer information on retirement savings decisions. Unpublished
manuscript.
Boczkowski, P. J. (2009). Technology, monitoring, and imitation in contemporary
news work. Communication, Culture & Critique, 2(1):39–59.
Boczkowski, P. J. and de Santos, M. (2007). When more media equals less news: Pat-
terns of content homogenization in argentina’s leading print and online newspapers.
Political Communication, 24(2):167–180.
Boczkowski, P. J. and Peer, L. (2011). The choice gap: The divergent online news
preferences of journalists and consumers. Journal of Communication, 61(5):857–
876.
Bollinger, B. and Gillingham, K. (2012). Peer effects in the diffusion of solar photo-
voltaic panels. Marketing Science, 31(6):900–912.
Bolsen, T., Ferraro, P. J., and Miranda, J. J. (2014). Are voters more likely to contribute
to other public goods? evidence from a large-scale randomized policy experiment.
American Journal of Political Science, 58(1):17–30.
Bond, R. M., Fariss, C. J., Jones, J. J., Kramer, A. D., Marlow, C., Settle, J. E., and
Fowler, J. H. (2012). A 61-million-person experiment in social influence and polit-
ical mobilization. Nature, 489(7415):295–298.
31
Bowers, J., Fredrickson, M. M., and Panagopoulos, C. (2013). Reasoning about inter-
ference between units: A general framework. Political Analysis, 21(1):97–124.
Brisbane, A. S. (2012). Should the times be a truth vigilante? New York Times, January
12, 2012.
Broockman, D. E. (2013). Black politicians are more intrinsically motivated to ad-
vance blacks’ interests: A field experiment manipulating political incentives. Forth-
coming, American Journal of Political Science.
Butler, D. M. and Broockman, D. E. (2011). Do politicians racially discriminate
against constituents? A field experiment on state legislators. American Journal
of Political Science, 55(3):463–477.
Butler, D. M., Karpowitz, C. F., and Pope, J. C. (2012). A field experiment on legisla-
tors’ home styles: Service versus policy. Journal of Politics, 1(1):1–13.
Butler, D. M. and Nickerson, D. W. (2011). Can learning constituency opinion affect
how legislators vote? Results from a field experiment. Quarterly Journal of Political
Science, 6(1):55–83.
Carey, J. W. (1992). Technology and ideology: The case of the telegraph. In Commu-
nication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society, pages 201–230. Routledge.
Chalaby, J. K. (1996). Journalism as an anglo-american invention: A comparison of
the development of french and anglo-american journalism, 1830s-1920s. European
Journal of Communication, 11(3):303–326.
Cialdini, R. B. (2008). Normative social influence is underdetected. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 34(7):913–923.
Cialdini, R. B. and Goldstein, N. J. (2004). Social influence: Compliance and confor-
mity. Annual Review of Psychology, 55:591–621.
Cialdini, R. B., Reno, R. R., and Kallgren, C. A. (1990). A focus theory of normative
conduct: recycling the concept of norms to reduce littering in public places. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 58(6):1015.
Coppock, A. and Sircar, N. (2013). An experimental approach to causal identification
of spillover effects under general interference. Unpublished manuscript.
Costa, D. L. and Kahn, M. E. (2013). Energy conservation ‘nudges’ and environmen-
talist ideology: Evidence from a randomized residential electricity field experiment.
Journal of the European Economic Association, 11(3):680–702.
32
Crouse, T. (1973). The Boys on the Bus: Riding with the Campaign Press Corps.
Random House.
Cunningham, B. (2003). Re-thinking objectivity. Columbia Journalism Review,
42(2):24–32.
Darnton, R. (1975). Writing news and telling stories. Daedalus, 104(2):175–194. Ar-
ticleType: primary article / Issue Title: Wisdom, Revelation, and Doubt: Perspec-
tives on the First Millennium B.C. / Full publication date: Spring, 1975 / Copyright
c© 1975 American Academy of Arts & Sciences.
Deacon, D. and Stanyer, J. (2014). Mediatization: key concept or conceptual band-
wagon? Media, Culture & Society, 36(7):1032–1044.
Dobbs, M. (2012). The Rise of Political Fact-Checking. Technical report, New Amer-
ica Foundation, Washington, DC.
Duflo, E., Glennerster, R., and Kremer, M. (2007). Using randomization in devel-
opment economics research: A toolkit. Handbook of Development Economics,
4:3895–3962.
Dunwoody, S. (1980). The science writing inner club: A communication link between
science and the lay public. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 5(30):14–22.
Elizabeth, J., Rosenstiel, T., Ivancin, M., Loker, K., Lacy, S., and Son-
derman, J. (2015). Fact-checking and accountability journalism: Pop-
ular, effective — but sometimes misunderstood. American Press Insti-
tute, October 27, 2015. Downloaded November 13, 2015 from http:
//www.americanpressinstitute.org/publications/reports/
survey-research/fact-checking-journalists-survey/.
Elliott, P. (1978). Professional ideology and organizational change: The journalist
since 1800. In Boyce, G., Curran, J., and Wingate, P., editors, Newspaper His-
tory: From the Seventeenth Century to the Present Day, pages 172–191. Constable,
London.
Esser, F. and Umbricht, A. (2014). The Evolution of Objective and Interpretative
Journalism in the Western Press Comparing Six News Systems since the 1960s.
Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 91(2):229–249.
Fink, K. and Schudson, M. (2014). The rise of contextual journalism, 1950s–2000s.
Journalism, 15(1):3–20.
33
Frantzich, S. (2002). Watching the watchers: The nature and content of campaign ad
watches. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 7(2):34–57.
Fridkin, K., Kenney, P. J., and Wintersieck, A. (2015). Liar, liar, pants on fire: How
fact-checking influences citizens’ reactions to negative advertising. Political Com-
munication, 32(1):127–151.
Fritz, B., Keefer, B., and Nyhan, B. (2004). All the President’s Spin: George W. Bush,
the media, and the truth. Touchstone Books.
Gans, H. J. (2003). Democracy and the News. Oxford University Press.
Gans, H. J. (2004). Deciding what’s news: A study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly
News, Newsweek, and Time. Northwestern University Press, Evanston, IL.
Garrett, R. K., Nisbet, E. C., and Lynch, E. K. (2013). Undermining the corrective
effects of media-based political fact checking? the role of contextual cues and naı¨ve
theory. Journal of Communication, 63(4):617–637.
Gentzkow, M. and Shapiro, J. M. (2010). What drives media slant? Evidence from
U.S. daily newspapers. Econometrica, 78(1):35–71.
Gerber, A. S., Gimpel, J. G., Green, D. P., and Shaw, D. R. (2011). How large and
long-lasting are the persuasive effects of televised campaign ads? Results from a
randomized field experiment. American Political Science Review, 105(1):135–150.
Gerber, A. S. and Green, D. P. (2012). Field experiments: Design, analysis, and
interpretation. W. W. Norton & Company.
Gerber, A. S., Green, D. P., and Larimer, C. W. (2008). Social pressure and voter
turnout: Evidence from a large-scale field experiment. American Political Science
Review, 102(01):33–48.
Gerber, A. S., Karlan, D., and Bergan, D. (2009). Does the media matter? a field
experiment measuring the effect of newspapers on voting behavior and political
opinions. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 1(2):35–52.
Gerber, A. S. and Rogers, T. (2009). Descriptive social norms and motivation to vote:
everybody’s voting and so should you. Journal of Politics, 71(01):178–191.
Glowaki, C., Johnson, T. J., and Kranenburg, K. E. (2004). Use of newspaper political
adwatches from 1988-2000. Newspaper Research Journal, 25(4):40–54.
34
Goldstein, N. J., Cialdini, R. B., and Griskevicius, V. (2008). A room with a viewpoint:
Using social norms to motivate environmental conservation in hotels. Journal of
Consumer Research, 35(3):472–482.
Graves, L. (2016). Deciding what’s true: The fact-checking movement in American
journalism. Columbia University Press.
Graves, L. and Glaisyer, T. (2012). The fact-checking universe in spring 2012: An
overview. New America Foundation Media Policy Initiative Research Paper.
Graves, L. and Konieczna, M. (2015). Sharing the news: Journalistic collaboration as
field repair. International Journal of Communication, 9:1966–1984.
Graves, L., Nyhan, B., and Reifler, J. (2015). The diffusion of fact-
checking: Understanding the growth of a journalistic innovation. Amer-
ican Press Institute. April 22, 2015. Downloaded November 13, 2015
from http://www.americanpressinstitute.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/04/The-Growth-of-Fact-Checking.pdf.
Grossman, G. and Paler, L. (2015). Using field experiments to study political insti-
tutions. In Gandhi, J. and Ruiz-Rufino, R., editors, The Handbook of Comparative
Political Institutions. Routledge. Unpublished manuscript.
Hallin, D. C. (1992). The passing of the ”high modernism” of American journalism.
Journal of Communication, 42(3):14–25.
Hamilton, J. T. (2004). All the News That’s Fit to Sell: How the Market Transforms
Information into News. Princeton University Press.
Høyer, S. and Po¨ttker, H., editors (2005). Diffusion of the news paradigm 1850-2000.
Nordicom Go¨teborg.
Izadi, E. (2015). How newspapers covered abraham lincoln’s assassination 150 years
ago. Washington Post, April 14, 2015. Downloaded May 4, 2015 from http://
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/style-blog/wp/2015/04/14/
how-newspapers-covered-abraham-lincolns-assassination-150-years-ago/.
Jamieson, K. H. and Cappella, J. N. (1997). Setting the record straight: Do ad watches
help or hurt? Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 2(1):13–22.
Kaplan, R. L. (2002). Politics and the American Press: The Rise of Objectivity, 1865-
1920. Cambridge University Press.
35
Kaplan, R. L. (2006). The News About New Institutionalism: Journalism’s Ethic of
Objectivity and Its Political Origins. Political Communication, 23(2):173–185.
Kast, F., Meier, S., and Pomeranz, D. (2012). Under-savers anonymous: Evidence on
self-help groups and peer pressure as a savings commitment device. Unpublished
manuscript.
Kessler, G. (2014). Candidates flinging pinocchios at each other. Wash-
ington Post, April 28, 2014. Downloaded June 5, 2014 from http:
//www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/wp/2014/
04/28/candidates-flinging-pinocchios-at-each-other/.
Kiefe, C. I., Allison, J. J., Williams, O. D., Person, S. D., Weaver, M. T., and Weiss-
man, N. W. (2001). Improving quality improvement using achievable benchmarks
for physician feedback: a randomized controlled trial. JAMA, 285(22):2871–2879.
Klinenberg, E. (2005). Convergence: News production in a digital age. Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 597(1):48–64.
Kolstad, J. T. (2013). Information and quality when motivation is intrinsic: Evidence
from surgeon report cards. American Economic Review, 103(7):2875–2910.
Ladd, J. M. (2011). Why Americans hate the media and how it matters. Princeton
University Press.
Larcinese, V., Puglisi, R., and Snyder, J. M. (2011). Partisan bias in economic news:
Evidence on the agenda-setting behavior of us newspapers. Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 95(9):1178–1189.
Lee, A. M., Lewis, S. C., and Powers, M. (2014). Audience clicks and news placement:
A study of time-lagged influence in online journalism. Communication Research,
41(4):505–530.
Levi, M. and Stoker, L. (2000). Political trust and trustworthiness. Annual Review of
Political Science, 3(1):475–507.
Livingstone, A. G., Young, H., and Manstead, A. S. (2011). ‘we drink, therefore we
are:’ the role of group identification and norms in sustaining and challenging heavy
drinking “culture. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 14(5):637–649.
Loewen, P. and MacKenzie, M. K. (2015). Representation in a federal system: A field
experiment. Forthcoming, Journal of Experimental Political Science.
36
Loewen, P. J. and Rubenson, D. (2011). For want of a nail: Negative persuasion in a
party leadership race. Party Politics, 17(1):45–65.
Loosen, W. and Schmidt, J.-H. (2012). (re-)discovering the audience. Information,
Communication & Society, 15(6):867–887.
Lowrey, W. (2012). Journalism Innovation and the Ecology of News Production Insti-
tutional Tendencies. Journalism & Communication Monographs, 14(4):214–287.
Lowrey, W. (2015). The Emergence and Development of News Fact-Checking Sites.
Journalism Studies, 0(0):1–19.
Lowrey, W. and Woo, C. W. (2010). The News Organization in Uncertain Times:
Business or Institution? Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 87(1):41–
61.
Marshall, M. N., Shekelle, P. G., Leatherman, S., and Brook, R. H. (2000). The public
release of performance data: what do we expect to gain? a review of the evidence.
JAMA, 283(14):1866–1874.
McClendon, G. H. (2014). Social esteem and participation in contentious politics:
A field experiment at an lgbt pride rally. American Journal of Political Science,
58(2):279–290.
Meer, J. (2011). Brother, can you spare a dime? peer pressure in charitable solicitation.
Journal of Public Economics, 95(7):926–941.
Moore, R. T. (2012). Multivariate continuous blocking to improve political science
experiments. Political Analysis, 20(4):460–479.
Moore, R. T. (2014). blocktools: Blocking, assignment, and diagnosing interference
in randomized experiments. Version 0.6-1, May 2014.
Nickerson, D. W. (2008). Is voting contagious? evidence from two field experiments.
American Political Science Review, 102(1):49–57.
Nyhan, B. and Reifler, J. (2014). The effect of fact-checking on elites: A field experi-
ment on u.s. state legislators. American Journal of Political Science.
Paluck, E. L. (2009). Reducing intergroup prejudice and conflict using the media:
A field experiment in rwanda. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
96(3):574–587.
37
Paluck, E. L. (2011). Peer pressure against prejudice: A high school field experi-
ment examining social network change. Journal of Experimental Social Psychol-
ogy, 47(2):350–358.
Paluck, E. L. and Shepherd, H. (2012). The salience of social referents: A field ex-
periment on collective norms and harassment behavior in a school social network.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 103(6):899–915.
Patterson, T. E. (1993). Out of Order: How the decline of the political parties and the
growing power of the news media undermine the American way of electing presi-
dents. Knopf.
Philipson, T. (2000). External treatment effects and program implementation bias.
National Bureau of Economic Research working paper.
Puglisi, R. and Snyder, J. M. (2011). Newspaper coverage of political scandals. Jour-
nal of Politics, 73(3):1–20.
Puglisi, R. and Snyder, J. M. (2015). The balanced us press. Journal of the European
Economic Association, 13(2):240–264.
Reese, S. D. and Danielian, L. H. (1989). Intermedia influence and the drug issue:
Converging on cocaine. In Shoemaker, P. J., editor, Communication Campaigns
About Drugs: Government, Media, and the Public, pages 29–46. L. Erlbaum Asso-
ciates.
Reinemann, C. (2004). Routine reliance revisited: Exploring media importance
for german political journalists. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly,
81(4):857–876.
Robertson, L. (2005-01). Campaign trail veterans for truth. American Journalism
Review, 26:38–43.
Robinowitz, D. L. and Dudley, R. A. (2006). Public reporting of provider performance:
can its impact be made greater? Annual Review of Public Health, 27:517–536.
Rosen, J. (1999). What are journalists for? Yale University Press.
Sauder, M., Lynn, F., and Podolny, J. M. (2012). Status: Insights from organizational
sociology. Annual Review of Sociology, 38:267–283.
Schudson, M. (1995). The power of news. Harvard University Press.
38
Schudson, M. (2001). The Objectivity Norm in American Journalism. Journalism,
2(2):149–170.
Schultz, P. W., Nolan, J. M., Cialdini, R. B., Goldstein, N. J., and Griskevicius, V.
(2007). The constructive, destructive, and reconstructive power of social norms.
Psychological Science, 18(5):429–434.
Schumacher-Matos, E. (2012). Election 1: Fact Checking The NPR Fact Checkers.
National Public Radio. October 28, 2012. Downloaded June 5, 2014 from http:
//www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/wp/2014/04/
28/candidates-flinging-pinocchios-at-each-other/.
Shaw, D. L. (1967). News bias and the telegraph: A study of historical change. Jour-
nalism Quarterly, 44(1):3–12.
Shaw, D. R. (1999). A study of presidential campaign event effects from 1952 to 1992.
Journal of Politics, 61(2):387–422.
Shoemaker, P. J. and Reese, S. D. (1996). Mediating the Message: Theories of Influ-
ences on Mass Media Content. Longman, White Plains, N.Y, 2nd ed edition.
Sigal, L. V. (1973). Reporters and Officials: The Organization and Politics of News-
making. D. C. Heath, Lexington, MA.
Sinclair, B., McConnell, M., and Green, D. P. (2012). Detecting spillover effects: De-
sign and analysis of multilevel experiments. American Journal of Political Science,
56(4):1055–1069.
Smith, B. (2011). The end of fact-checking. Politico. August 17, 2011. Downloaded
March 27, 2015 from http://www.politico.com/blogs/bensmith/
0811/The_end_of_factchecking.html.
Spivak, C. (2011). The fact-checking explosion. American Journalism Review, 32:38–
43.
Stepp, C. S. (1999). The State of the American Newspaper: Then and Now. American
Journalism Review, 14:60–76.
Stro¨mba¨ck, J. (2008). Four Phases of Mediatization: An Analysis of the Mediatization
of Politics. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 13(3):228–246.
Sullivan, M. (2012). Facts, Truth ... and May the Best Man Win. New York Times,
September 4, 2012.
39
Thussu, D. K. (2007). News as entertainment: the rise of global infotainment. Sage.
Underwood, D. (1995). When MBAs Rule the Newsroom. Columbia University Press.
Velthuis, O. (2006). Inside a world of spin: Four days at the world trade organization.
Ethnography, 7(1):125–150.
Waisbord, S. R. S. R. (2013). Reinventing professionalism : journalism and news in
global perspective. Polity Press.
Wechsler, H., Nelson, T. F., Lee, J. E., Seibring, M., Lewis, C., and Keeling, R. P.
(2003). Perception and reality: A national evaluation of social norms marketing
interventions to reduce college students’ heavy alcohol use. Journal of Studies on
Alcohol and Drugs, 64(4):484–494.
Werch, C. E., Pappas, D. M., Carlson, J. M., DiClemente, C. C., Chally, P. S., and
Sinder, J. A. (2000). Results of a social norm intervention to prevent binge drinking
among first-year residential college students. Journal of American College Health,
49(2):85–92.
Zelizer, B. (1993). Journalists as interpretive communities. Critical Studies in Mass
Communication, 10(3):219–237.
40
Appendix
Table A1: Newspaper sample
State Newspaper Headquarters city
Alabama Birmingham News Birmingham
Arizona The Arizona Daily Star Tuscon
Arizona The Arizona Republic Phoenix
Arkansas Arkansas Democrat-Gazette Little Rock
California Contra Costa Times Walnut Creek
California Daily News Woodland Hills
California Fresno Bee Fresno
California Investor’s Business Daily Los Angeles
California Sacramento Bee Sacramento
California San Diego Union-Tribune San Diego
California San Jose Mercury News San Jose
California The Los Angeles Times Los Angeles
California The Orange County Register Santa Ana
California The San Francisco Chronicle San Francisco
Colorado The Denver Post Denver
Connecticut Hartford Courant Hartford
District of Columbia The Washington Times Washington
Florida Daytona Beach News-Journal Daytona Beach
Florida Orlando Sentinel Orlando
Florida Sarasota Herald-Tribune Sarasota
Florida South Florida Sun-Sentinel Fort Lauderdale
Florida The Florida Times-Union Jacksonville
Florida The Palm Beach Post West Palm Beach
Florida The Tampa Tribune Tampa
Hawaii The Honolulu Star-Advertiser Honolulu
Illinois Chicago Sun-Times Chicago
Illinois Chicago Tribune Chicago
Illinois Daily Herald Arlington Heights
Indiana Indianapolis Star Indianapolis
Iowa The Des Moines Register Des Moines
Kentucky Lexington Herald-Leader Lexington
Kentucky The Courier-Journal Louisville
Louisiana Times-Picayune New Orleans
Maryland The Sun Baltimore
Massachusetts Boston Herald Boston
Massachusetts The Boston Globe Boston
Michigan Detroit Free Press Detroit
Michigan The Detroit News Detroit
Table A1 – continued from previous page
State Newspaper City (HQ)
Michigan The Grand Rapids Press Grand Rapids
Minnesota St. Paul Pioneer Press St. Paul
Minnesota Star Tribune Minneapolis
Missouri Kansas City Star Kansas City
Missouri St. Louis Post-Dispatch St. Louis
Nebraska Omaha World-Herald Omaha
Nevada Las Vegas Review-Journal Las Vegas
New Jersey Asbury Park Press Neptune
New Jersey The Record Hackensack
New Mexico Albuquerque Journal Albuquerque
New York Daily News New York City
New York New York Post New York City
New York Newsday Long Island
New York Rochester Democrat and Chronicle Rochester
New York The Buffalo News Buffalo
New York The Journal News White Plains
New York The Post-Standard Syracuse
North Carolina The Charlotte Observer Charlotte
North Carolina The News and Observer Raleigh
Ohio Akron Beacon Journal Akron
Ohio Dayton Daily News Dayton
Ohio The Blade Toledo
Ohio The Cincinnati Enquirer Cincinnati
Ohio The Columbus Dispatch Columbus
Oklahoma The Oklahoman Oklahoma City
Oklahoma Tulsa World Tulsa
Pennsylvania Pittsburgh Post-Gazette Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania The Morning Call Allentown
Pennsylvania The Philadelphia Daily News Philadelphia
Pennsylvania The Philadelphia Inquirer Philadelphia
Pennsylvania Tribune-Review Pittsburgh
South Carolina The State Columbia
Tennessee Knoxville News Sentinel Knoxville
Tennessee The Commercial Appeal Memphis
Tennessee The Tennessean Nashville
Texas Fort Worth Star-Telegram Fort Worth
Texas Houston Chronicle Houston
Texas San Antonio Express-News San Antonio
Texas The Dallas Morning News Dallas
Utah The Salt Lake Tribune Salt Lake City
Virginia The Virginian-Pilot Norfolk
Table A1 – continued from previous page
State Newspaper City (HQ)
Virginia USA Today Arlington
Washington Seattle Times Seattle
Washington The News Tribune Tacoma
Table A2: Balance statistics
(a) Journalists
Supply Demand Control p-value
Competitive 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.95
Political articles 7.90 8.04 7.82 0.84
N 522 504 663
(b) Newspapers
Supply (H) Supply (L) Demand (H) Demand (L) Control p-value
Competitive 0.38 0.38 0.35 0.35 0.38 1.00
Reporters 22.1 21.1 19.5 20.4 20 0.98
N 16 16 17 17 16
Unweighted means by experimental condition. p-values are from F-tests of the joint null hy-
pothesis that all coefficients are zero in OLS regressions where the characteristic in question
is the outcome variable and covariates are indicators for treatment conditions (available upon
request).
Table A3: Spillover analysis: Untreated journalists
Coefficient
(SE)
Supply (newspaper) 0.03
(0.03)
Demand (newspaper) 0.03
(0.03)
Constant 0.01
(0.01)
N 663
* p < 0.05 (one-sided). Ordinary least squares estimates with robust standard errors clustered
by newspaper. The outcome variable is the number of articles returned by a keyword search
for articles mentioning fact-checking or dedicated fact-checkers written by political reporters
at a large sample of newspapers excluding current or former PolitiFact affiliates or newspapers
with dedicated fact-checkers (see Table A1 in Appendix for full list).
Table A4: Journalist treatment effect estimates (full models)
Treatment-specific IPTWs
Unweighted Demand Supply
Demand 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Supply 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Political keywords (/100) -0.02 -0.02 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Constant 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Observations 1689 1689 1689
* p < 0.05 (one-sided). OLS models with robust standard errors. Bolded coefficients are the treatment effect esti-
mates with treatment-specific inverse probability of treatment weights (IPTWs) that appear in Table 1b. The outcome
variable is the number of articles returned by a keyword search for articles mentioning fact-checking or dedicated fact-
checkers written by political reporters at a large sample of newspapers excluding current or former PolitiFact affiliates
or newspapers with dedicated fact-checkers (see Table A1 in Appendix for full list).
Table A5: Newspaper treatment effect estimates (full models)
Treatment-specific inverse probability of treatment weights
Unweighted Demand low Demand high Supply low Supply high
Demand low 0.48 0.49 0.46 0.45 0.51
(0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.37)
Demand high 0.79 0.80 0.79 0.78 0.81
(0.51) (0.52) (0.50) (0.51) (0.52)
Supply low 0.78* 0.80* 0.76* 0.76* 0.81*
(0.45) (0.46) (0.45) (0.44) (0.46)
Supply high 1.16* 1.17* 1.14* 1.14* 1.17*
(0.67) (0.65) (0.66) (0.67) (0.68)
Political keywords (/100) 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 0.21 0.23 0.17 0.17 0.24
(0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.18) (0.18)
Observations 82 82 82 82 82
* p < 0.05 (one-sided). OLS models with robust standard errors. Bolded coefficients are the treatment effect esti-
mates with treatment-specific inverse probability of treatment weights (IPTWs) that appear in Table 1b. The outcome
variable is the number of articles returned by a keyword search for articles mentioning fact-checking or dedicated fact-
checkers written by political reporters at a large sample of newspapers excluding current or former PolitiFact affiliates
or newspapers with dedicated fact-checkers (see Table A1 in Appendix for full list).
Table A6: Pooled supply and demand treatments
Coefficient
(SE)
Supply (high and low saturation) 0.97**
(0.42)
Demand (high and low saturation) 0.64*
(0.33)
Political keywords (/100) 0.01
(0.01)
Constant 0.21
(0.16)
Observations 82
* p < 0.05 (one-sided); ** p < 0.05 (two-sided). OLS models with robust standard errors. The outcome variable is
the number of articles returned by a keyword search for articles mentioning fact-checking or dedicated fact-checkers
written by political reporters at a large sample of newspapers excluding current or former PolitiFact affiliates or news-
papers with dedicated fact-checkers (see Table A1 in Appendix for full list).
Table A7: Treatment effect estimates: RQ1 (journalists)
RQ1
Supply treatment 0.05
(0.05)
Demand treatment 0.03
(0.02)
Political coverage (/100) -0.01
(0.09)
Previous fact-checking coverage (/100) 0.01
(0.09)
Supply × previous fact-checking (/100) -0.05
(0.08)
Demand × previous fact-checking (/100) -0.03
(0.04)
Constant 0.03
(0.01)
N 1689
* p < 0.05 (one-sided). OLS models with robust standard errors. The outcome variable is the number of articles
returned by a keyword search for articles mentioning fact-checking or dedicated fact-checkers written by political
reporters at a large sample of newspapers excluding current or former PolitiFact affiliates or newspapers with dedicated
fact-checkers (see Table A1 in Appendix for full list).
Table A8: Treatment effect estimates: RQ1 (newspapers)
RQ1
Supply treatment (high) 1.76
(1.62)
Supply treatment (low) 0.60
(0.59)
Demand treatment (high) 0.58
(0.50)
Demand treatment (low) 0.99
(0.71)
Political coverage (/1000) 0.03
(0.02)
Previous fact-checking coverage (2012) -0.01*
(0.005)
Supply (high) × previous fact-checking -0.02
(0.03)
Supply (low) × previous fact-checking 0.01
(0.02)
Demand (high) × previous fact-checking 0.01
(0.02)
Demand (low) × previous fact-checking -0.01
(0.01)
Constant 0.33
(0.23)
N 82
* p < 0.05 (one-sided). OLS models with robust standard errors. The outcome variable is the number of articles
returned by a keyword search for articles mentioning fact-checking or dedicated fact-checkers written by political
reporters at a large sample of newspapers excluding current or former PolitiFact affiliates or newspapers with dedicated
fact-checkers (see Table A1 in Appendix for full list).
Figure A1: Initial supply treatment email
Email sent September 22, 2014 to journalists in the supply treatment condition.
Figure A2: Initial demand treatment email
Email sent September 22, 2014 to journalists in the demand treatment condition.
